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1 Introduction
The capital budgeting process is at the heart of the functioning of the
modern corporation. As it is by now well understood, what makes the prob-
lem non-trivial is the existence of informational asymmetries and incentive
problems. Managers often have superior information about the profitabil-
ity of existing investment projects. If their interests differ from the ones
of the shareholders, then appropriate incentive mechanisms have to be put
in place in order to achieve an efficient allocation of resources (Harris and
Raviv, 1996).
It is commonly assumed that managers prefer sometimes to finance in-
vestment projects with negative NPV, either because they may have empire-
building preferences or because more funds allow them to exert less effort
(Stein, 2003; Khanna and Tice, 2001; Harris and Raviv, 1996). Thus, unless
countervailing incentives are put in place, managers will have a tendency to
invest too much. Various mechanisms have been studied in the literature to
address the overinvestment problem. The most common mechanisms use an
initial capital spending limit for the subsidiary, monetary incentives and au-
diting to verify the information given by the subsidiary’s manager (Harris,
Kriebel and Raviv, 1982; Harris and Raviv, 1996). The capital structure
also plays an important role as a managerial incentive mechanism (see e.g.
Dess´i and Robertson, 2003). Most of the research on internal capital mar-
kets has overlooked the interaction with external capital markets, and in
this paper we want to study the issues appearing when multiple sources of
financing, external and internal, can be used in the budgeting process when
the holding company has limited liability with respect to the subsidiary’s
obligations and the subsidiary’s manager has also limited liability in his
compensation contract. This occurs in a business group, which is formed by
legally independent firms but it has an internal market that allocate capital
among the member firms (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005).
Stulz (1990) has analyzed debt financing as a method to limit the over-
investment problem. In his model debt forces the firm to pay a fixed amount
of cash. This reduces overinvestment when the firm has a lot of cash, but in-
duces under-investment in the opposite case. We consider another rationale
for using debt as part of an optimal governance mechanism. In our model
a profit-maximizing controlling shareholder (CS) controls a subsidiary. The
manager of the subsidiary has private information about the quality of an
investment project, and has ‘empire-building’ preferences. Internal capital
however is controlled by CS, which has to decide (possibly after collecting
information from the subsidiary’s manager) whether to implement the in-
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vestment. CS also decides how to finance the investment project, whether
using internal capital or issuing debt. Notice that the decision to finance the
investment project is ultimately taken by the profit-maximizing CS; there
is no reason to use debt in order to reduce the amount of cash available
to CS, as it happens in the Stulz model, since CS has no empire-building
preferences. Debt is used because bankruptcy is costly for the subsidiary’s
managers, for example because it may destroy their firm-specific human cap-
ital or it may have a negative impact on their reputation. Since bankruptcy
is more likely when the quality of the subsidiary’s investment project is low,
debt financing reduces the incentive rents that CS needs to pay to the sub-
sidiary’s manager. Notice that CS may choose debt financing even in cases
in which there would be enough internal cash to finance the investment
project without resorting to external capital markets.
Bankruptcy is also costly for CS, although the cost may be different from
the one suffered by the subsidiary’s manager (see Stulz, 1999, for a discussion
of the costs induced by the possibility of bankruptcy), so that debt will
only be used when the reduction in managerial rents is substantial. Notice
also that debt will not be used if it is possible to provide incentives to the
manager in less costly ways (for example through performance contingent
pay). However, there will be a role for debt whenever there are restrictions
on other methods of providing incentives1; in particular, we show that the
choice of internal vs. external financing still plays a role if a ‘limited liability’
restriction is put on the set of feasible compensation contracts.
We emphasize that, in our model, debt is a more effective disciplinary
tool when bankruptcy is more costly for the subsidiary’s manager. There-
fore, when CS and the subsidiary are legally separate entities (as it is the
case in a business group) it is better to have the subsidiary to issue the debt.
This is the case despite the fact that issuing debt may be cheaper for the
holding company.
The literature on external finance in business groups is limited. One
interesting paper is Bianco and Nicodano (2004). They consider a model in
which a controlling shareholder has to decide whether to issue debt through
a holding or a partially owned subsidiary. They focus on asymmetric infor-
1As Stein (2003) observes, “problems in internal capital markets may be exacerbated
when divisional managers both: i) have a strong incentive to maximize their own division’s
capital allocation as opposed to profits; and ii) are powerful relative to the CEO -i.e., have
valuable specific human capital (either expertise or internal political clout), and so can
threaten to disrupt the firm’s activities.”. In these cases, using debt may be the best
instrument available to provide incentives, since other threats (such as as dismissal by the
CEO) are not credible.
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mation between the controlling shareholder and the lenders, and ignore the
role of debt as an incentive instrument, which is instead the focus of this
paper.
The article is structured as follows. The next section presents the model.
In section 3 we discuss the role of external debt in providing incentives when
monetary incentives cannot be given to the subsidiary’s manager. The anal-
ysis is then generalized in section 4, where we discuss the optimal mechanism
when CS can use both external debt and direct monetary incentives. Sec-
tion 5 contains the conclusions, and the appendix collects the proofs of our
results.
2 The Model
A firm (holding company) has a subsidiary and an amount of cash M to
invest. The subsidiary has no physical assets but it has access to an in-
vestment project. The project requires an investment of I at time 0, and it
yields a stochastic gross return R at time 1; we will assume M ≥ I, so that
internal financing is always possible. The gross return R takes value V with
probability p, and 0 with probability (1− p). The value of p is only known
to the managers of the subsidiary. However, it is common knowledge that p
can take either the value p1 or p2, with p1 < p2, and that the probability of
a value pi is θi ∈ (0, 1).
Since the subsidiary has no cash, if the investment project is enacted
it has to be financed. Financing can either come through internal capital
markets or through a bank. We assume that the subsidiary is a legally
separate entity, so any financing by the bank has to be repaid with funds
generated by the investment project2. We also assume that bankruptcy has
a fixed cost c for the subsidiary’s manager and k for CS.
The subsidiary’s manager receives private benefits from running the
project which are proportional to the gross return of the project R. When
she receives an expected salary of w, the expected utility when the project
is enacted and financed with internal funds is:
UInt = bE (R) +w
where b > 0 is the coefficient that measures the private benefits. The ex-
pected utility when the project is enacted and it is financed with external
2We consider only subsidiary-issued debt as a form of financing. In our model debt
is useful only if bankruptcy is costly for the subsidiary’s manager. CS has the money to
finance the project without using external financing, so there is no point in issuing debt
or equity.
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funds is:
UExt = bE (R) + w − cPr (fail)
where Pr (fail) is the probability of bankruptcy and c the fixed cost of
bankruptcy for the subsidiary’s manager.
We assume that the subsidiary’s manager can obtain a utility of zero out-
side the subsidiary, so each scheme of compensation and financing proposed
by the CS has to give the manager this level of utility.
CS has to decide whether or not to enact the project, and in case it is
enacted whether to finance it through internal or external funds. The goal
of CS is to maximize the expected profit of the subsidiary, net of the salary
paid to subsidiary’s managers. The risk free interest rate is r ≥ 0.
As a preliminary observation, we notice that under full information, the
project is funded with internal funds whenever pV − (1 + r) I − w ≥ 0.
Notice further that since b > 0, we can set w = 0, which implies that a
project receives internal funding if and only if p ≥ (1+r)IV , the standard
‘positive NPV’ rule. At last, we observe that under complete information
external markets are never used, since CS prefers to avoid bankruptcy.
When there is asymmetric information over p CS can set up a direct
revelation mechanism in order to learn the value of p. The mechanism
receives as input a message bp by the subsidiary’s manager, and delivers as
output a probability of internal financing, αI (bp), a probability of external
financing, αE (bp), and a salary level.
The compensation for the manager may depend on the announcementbp, on whether the investment project is enacted and, if it is enacted, on the
outcome of the investment project and on the way in which the project is
financed. In principle, compensation may depend on the financing decision,
but given risk neutrality by the manager we can consider without loss of
generality a single compensation function W (R, bp). The expected salary
when p is the true state of the world and bp is announced will be denoted as
w (p, bp), where
w (p, bp) = (1− p)W (0, bp) + pW (V, bp) ,
and we will also use the notation w(p) = w(p, p). As a last piece of nota-
tion, let us denote by rD the interest rate on debt which is paid when the
subsidiary asks for external funds. For the moment, we take the value of rD
as given, and we will later endogenize this value.
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The expected profit of CS for a given mechanism (αI ,αE, w) is:
B =
2X
i=1
£
αiI (piV − (1 + r) I) + αiE (pi (V − (1 + rD) I)− (1− pi) k)− wi
¤
θi
where we have simplified the notation using αiI = αI (pi), αiE = αE (pi) and
wi = w (pi).
If we denote by
HiI = piV − (1 + r) I
HiE = pi (V − (1 + rD) I)− (1− pi) k
the expected return of enacting a project of type i with internal (HiI) and
external (HiE) financing respectively, the expected profit can be written as:
B =
2X
i=1
£
αiIHiI + αiEHiE − wi
¤
θi
The mechanism has to satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility
constraints, given by
U (p1) = b
¡
α1I + α1E
¢
p1V + w
1 − α1E (1− p1) c ≥ 0
U (p2) = b
¡
α2I + α2E
¢
p2V + w
2 − α2E (1− p2) c ≥ 0
b
¡
α2I + α2E
¢
p2V + w
2 − α2E (1− p2) c ≥ b
¡
α1I + α1E
¢
p2V + w (p2, p1)− α1E (1− p2) c;
b
¡
α1I + α1E
¢
p1V + w
1 − α1E (1− p1) c ≥ b
¡
α2I + α2E
¢
p1V + w (p1, p2)− α2E (1− p1) c;
Furthermore, feasibility requires
αiI ≥ 0; αiE ≥ 0; αiI + αiE ≤ 1.
In order to make the problem interesting we assume H2I > 0 > H
1
I . More-
over, we concentrate attention on the case
p2 (1 + rD) ≥ (1 + r) ,
that is, the interest rate rD must be high enough to give at least the
same profitability as the risk-free interest rate when only good projects are
financed. This condition implies H2I > H
2
E. As a last remark, observe that
H2E < 0 implies H
1
E < 0.
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3 Absence of Monetary Incentives
We first analyze the restricted problem in which monetary incentives cannot
be used, and the financing policy is the only way to provide incentives to
the manager. This case is simpler and it helps us in highlighting the role
played by debt financing in incentive provision. The problem is
max
α1I ,α
1
E ,α
2
I ,α
2
E
£
α1IH1I + α1EH1E
¤
θ1 +
£
α2IH2I + α2EH2E
¤
θ2 (1)
s.t.
U (pi) = b
¡
αiI + αiE
¢
piV − αiE (1− pi) c ≥ 0 i = 1, 2
b
¡
α2I + α2E
¢
p2V − α2E (1− p2) c ≥ b
¡
α1I + α1E
¢
p2V − α1E (1− p2) c
b
¡
α1I + α1E
¢
p1V − α1E (1− p1) c ≥ b
¡
α2I + α2E
¢
p1V − α2E (1− p1) c
α1I ≥ 0; α1E ≥ 0; α2I ≥ 0; α2E ≥ 0
α1I + α1E ≤ 1; α2I + α2E ≤ 1
The solution to this problem, depending the value of the parameters, may
be pooling or separating. Notice that when the solution is pooling, the
incentive compatibility constraints can be ignored.
We may have three types of pooling solutions:
1. Never invest, that is α1E = α1I = α2E = α2I = 0. In this case the value
of the objective function is 0 and the individual rationality constraints
are always satisfied.
2. Always invest with external funds, α1E = α2E = 1 and α1I = α2I = 0.
The value of the objective function in this case is
ΩExt = H
1
Eθ1 +H2Eθ2
and the individual rationality constraint for type p1 is bp1V−(1− p1) c ≥
0.
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3. Always invest with internal funds, α1E = α2E = 0 and α2I = α1I = 1.
The value of the objective function in this case is
ΩInt = H
1
I θ1 +H2I θ2
and the individual rationality constraints are always satisfied.
When bp1V − (1− p1) c ≥ 0, so that individual rationality is not an issue,
and a pooling solution is chosen, then the choice is made comparing the
values 0, ΩExt and ΩInt. Call Ω = max {0,ΩExt,ΩInt} the highest value of
the objective function attainable with a pooling solution.
This value will have to be compared with the value that can be obtained
under separation. Separation is impossible if α2I = 1, since in that case type
p1 is better off announcing p2. In order to reduce incentives to lie for type
p1, it turns out to be optimal (see appendix) to set α2E > 0
When bp1V − (1− p1) c ≥ 0, it is necessary to set α2E = 1 in order to
make sure that incentive constraints are satisfied. However, this implies
that a manager observing p1 can obtain a strictly positive utility. Thus,
the optimal solution requires to give to the manager that level of utility.
Absent monetary compensation, the only way to give utility to a manager
is to implement the project with positive probability.
If the project is implemented with internal funds then the probability
α1I has to satisfy
α1Ibp1V = bp1V − (1− p1) c → α1I =
bp1V − (1− p1) c
bp1V
Define σ = bp1V−(1−p1)cbp1V . Then the value of the objective function when a
separating solution is implemented is
Υ = σH1I θ1 +H2Eθ2
Proposition 1 When p1bV − (1− p1) c > 0 the possible solutions are de-
scribed as follows.
1. If Ω > Υ then a pooling solution is chosen. The optimal pooling struc-
ture is obtained comparing the values 0, ΩExt and ΩInt.
2. If Υ ≥ Ω then the separating solution α1I = σ,α1E = 0, α2E = 1 and
α2I = 0 is optimal.
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The condition p1bV − (1− p1) c > 0 is equivalent to assuming a low value
of c, the bankruptcy cost for the manager. As previously observed, this
makes sure that the participation constraints are always satisfied, no matter
what is the policy chosen by CS. The counterpart is that debt financing,
although it reduces the expected utility of the manager, cannot entirely
eliminate the agency problem. More precisely, it is impossible to get a
separating equilibrium in which only the good projects are enacted. Instead,
whenever a separating equilibrium is the optimal solution, good projects will
be implemented with probability 1 but financed with debt. This reduces the
utility we have to give to the subsidiary’s manager in the case p1. However,
since we are considering the case p1bV − (1− p1) c > 0, we have to give a
strictly positive utility to a manager of type p1 since otherwise separation
would not occur. This is obtained by setting α1I > 0, that is, allowing
for some inefficient investment. The lowest value of α1I inducing separation
is σ, and it is increasing with p1. Notice also that the lowest value of p1
compatible with the condition p1bV − (1− p1) c > 0 is p1 =
c
bV+c . At this
value we have σ = 0.
The conditions described in Proposition 1 depend on the value rD. We
may therefore ask whether the conditions are satisfied in the case in which
the capital market uses the fact that the firm is asking for debt financing as
a signal about the quality of the project. In other words, can the conditions
that make a certain solution optimal still be satisfied when the value of rD
is determined endogenously in a competitive capital market?
If we call Pr (pi|D) the conditional probability assigned to pi by the
bank when the firm asks for debt financing, then we have:
Pr (p1|D) = θ1α
1
E
θ1α1E + θ2α2E
Pr (p2|D) = θ2α
2
E
θ1α1E + θ2α2E
(2)
whenever θ1α1E + θ2α2E > 0. If θ1α1E + θ2α2E = 0 (that is, the firms asks
for debt financing with probability zero) then we can assign arbitrarily the
belief Pr (p1|D). Looking at the pooling solutions in which external financ-
ing is not used, if we set Pr (p1|D) = 1, so that rD is obtained solving
p1 (1 + rD) = (1 + r), then the conditions for optimality appear to be com-
patible with this value of rD.
If the firm asks for debt financing with positive probability, the rate rD
is determined by the condition
(p1 Pr (p1|D) + p2 Pr (p2|D)) (1 + rD) = (1 + r)
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which, using (2), becomes¡
p1θ1α1E + p2θ2α2E
¢
(1 + rD) =
¡
θ1α1E + θ2α2E
¢
(1 + r) ,
and, in the case α1E = α2E = 1 (pooling solution with debt financing)
(p1θ1 + p2θ2) (1 + rD) = (1 + r). (3)
Observe that (p1θ1 + p2θ2) (1 + rD) is the unconditional expected value of
lending a monetary unit at the rate rD. One of the conditions which have
to be satisfied to make this solution optimal is
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2 ≤ H1Eθ1 +H2Eθ2,
that is, external financing is better than internal financing. When rD is
given by (3), the condition is equivalent to
θ1p1 + θ2p2 ≥ 1,
which is impossible. We conclude that the pooling solution with external
financing is not possible when rD is determined endogenously.
Consider now the solution in which the two types are separated. In this
case the firm asks for debt financing only when the probability is p2, so that
rD is given by the condition p2 (1 + rD) = (1 + r). Thus the interest rate on
the debt is low. This creates a problem, since debt financing becomes espe-
cially attractive when the project has a low probability of success. Specifi-
cally, the condition Υ > ΩExt, which implies H1E < 0 may not be satisfied.
In order to make sure that debt financing is not optimal when p1 is observed,
the cost of bankruptcy for CS must be sufficiently high. Specifically, the con-
dition H1E < 0 becomes equivalent to (1− p1) k > p1V −
p1
p2
(1 + r)I . Only
when such condition is satisfied, a separating equilibrium becomes possible.
Consider now the case of high bankruptcy cost for the manager, that
is p1bV − (1− p1) c < 0. The main difference with respect to the case of
low c is that the participation constraint for the manager who observes p1
need not be automatically satisfied. In fact, if we set α1E = 1 the individual
rationality constraint is violated. This implies that the only possible pooling
solutions are:
1. Never invest, that is α1E = α1I = α2E = α2I = 0. In this case the value
of the objective function is 0 and the individual rationality constraints
are always satisfied.
9
2. Always invest with internal funds, α1E = α2E = 0 and α2I = α1I = 1.
The value of the objective function in this case is
ΩInt = H
1
I θ1 +H2I θ2
and the individual rationality constraints are always satisfied.
3. Invest with both external and internal funds, setting the probability
of external financing strictly lower than one.
Let us discuss this last case. As we are looking for a pooling solution, the
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied. If CS wants to use external
financing, the maximum value of the probability of using debt is determined
by the individual rationality constraint for the manager in case p1, that is
b
¡
α1I + α1E
¢
p1V − α1E (1− p1) c ≥ 0
α1E ≤ α1I
p1bV
(1− p1)c− p1bV
.
Thus, CS chooses the maximum value of α1E possible and, taking into ac-
count the feasibility constraint α1E + α1I ≤ 1, the solution in this case is
α1E =
p1bV
(1− p1)c
α1I =
(1− p1)c− p1bV
(1− p1)c
.
If we define β = (1−p1)c−p1bV(1−p1)c and ξ =
p1bV
(1−p1)c , this pooling solution will be
α1I = α2I = β, α1E = α2E = ξ. The value of the objective function in this case
is
ΩMix = βΩInt + ξΩExt
Therefore, the solution with mixed financing can only be optimal if ΩExt >
ΩInt.
Consider now a separating solution in which a subsidiary doesn’t invest
when p1 is the state of the world and it does when the state is p2. If
α2E = 0 (as in the optimal solution with complete information) the incentive
compatibility constraint for p1 is not satisfied. Therefore, to assure that the
manager is telling the truth, there must be a positive probability of external
financing in the state p2. We choose the minimal value of α2E, since we have
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made the assumption H2E < H
2
I , and we obtain: α1I = α1E = 0, α2I = β,
α2E = ξ. The value of the objective function will be:
Φ2 =
¡
βH2I + ξH2E
¢
θ2. (4)
For further reference, we also define
Φ1 =
¡
βH1I + ξH1E
¢
θ1. (5)
Proposition 2 If p1bV − (1− p1) c < 0 then:
1. The solution α1E = α1I = α2E = α2I = 0 is optimal when Φ2 ≤ 0 and
ΩInt ≤ 0.
2. The pooling solution with internal financing α1E = α2E = 0, α1I = α2I =
1 is optimal when: ΩInt ≥ 0, ΩInt ≥ Φ2, ΩInt ≥ Φ1 and ΩInt ≥ ΩExt.
3. The pooling solution α1I = α2I = β, α1E = α2E = ξ is optimal when
Φ1 ≥ 0 and ΩExt > ΩInt.
4. α1I = α1E = 0,α2I = β and α2E = ξ is optimal only if Φ1 ≤ 0, Φ2 ≥
max {0,ΩInt}.
In this case the value of c is high and therefore any solution with α1E = 1
would violate the participation constraint for the manager of type p1.
However, only in this situation we can reach a separating equilibrium
where the subsidiary doesn’t invest in p1 and it does in p2, using only the
way of financing as an incentive.
At the same time, if we suppose H2E > 0 the ‘never invest’ solution is
never optimal, since a positive profit can be attained by inducing separation,
that is, Φ2 will be always positive.
The expected profit of this separating solution can be written as:
Φ2 = [p2V − (β (1 + r) + ξp2 (1 + rD)) I − ξ (1− p2) k] θ2 (6)
Observe that when (1 + r) = p2 (1 + rD) (this will occur in a separating
equilibrium in which the subsidiary of type p2 asks for external financing
and capital markets are perfect) the expression (6) simplifies to
Φ2 = [(p2V − (1 + r) I)− ξ (1− p2) k] θ2
namely, the expected profit is equal to the first best minus the expected
cost of bankruptcy. If we also assume k = 0 (bankruptcy is not costly for
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CS), then the first best can be reached, and wages are not needed to provide
incentives.
The conclusion is that monetary incentives are necessary only when cap-
ital markets are not perfect or bankruptcy costs for CS are high3. If k > 0,
then the profit will be greater the smaller the value of p1 (if p1 is high a
pooling equilibrium can be a better option), the greater the value of p2, and
the greater c.
We now discuss the conditions for the separating mechanism to be op-
timal. In a separating mechanism, debt financing has to occur with posi-
tive probability, since otherwise type p1 would claim to be p2. As we have
discussed before, we will choose the lowest value of α2E that satisfies the
incentive compatibility constraint for p1. Thus, debt financing must occur
with an intermediate probability. Let α2I = β, α2E = ξ be the probabilities
of financing with internal funds and debt, respectively, under the optimal
mechanism. Then the condition
Φ1 ≤ 0
or, equivalently,
H1Eξ +H1I β ≤ 0 (7)
requires that when p = p1 it is not profitable to invest. If this value were pos-
itive, then the pooling solution with probabilities (β, ξ) of financing would
be better than the separating solution.
On the other hand, the inequality
0 ≤ Φ2
is always satisfied if H2E > 0. In this case, this solution is always profitable.
Remember that this was the reason why a ‘never invest’ solution is not
chosen in this case. If H2E < 0, this doesn’t always occur. Finally, we have
Φ2 > ΩInt
which says that the profit obtained under separation is better than the one
obtained under pooling.
3As it is usual in this type of literature, we are assuming that Headquarters is able
to implement the promised decisions once the information is disclosed (the commitment
assumption). If not, the separating equilibrium is impossible in the case k = 0, since
Headquarters would have incentives to deviate from the equilibrium and to finance with
debt the project of type p1.
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Looking now at the conditions for the optimality of the pooling solutions,
we observe that when H2E < 0 the ‘never invest’ solution becomes again
possible. One of the conditions for the optimality of this solution is Φ2 ≤ 0,
that is, the separating solution is not optimal. The other condition is
ΩInt < 0,
and it implies that it is not preferable to implement a pooling equilibrium
with internal financing.
Another possible solution is always to invest with internal financing. The
condition
ΩExt ≤ ΩInt,
means that the pooling equilibrium with internal financing is preferable to
the one that uses external financing. Observe that this last pooling solution
is not possible because it doesn’t satisfy the participation constraint for
type p1 (we have seen that there is no solution with α1E = 1); the condition
however implies that a mixed solution with positive probability of external
financing will be always worse than a solution in which financing always
occurs with internal funds.
The condition ΩInt ≥ 0 says that the expected profit must be positive,
while the condition
Φ1 ≤ ΩInt,
means that the pooling solution is better than the separating solution when
investment is made only when p = p1. This condition will be always satisfied
when H2E < 0. Similarly, the condition
Φ2 ≤ ΩInt
states that the pooling solution with internal resources must be better than
the separating solution in which investment only occurs when p = p2.
The last possibility is a pooling solution that uses external and internal
funds in both states. This is optimal when
Φ1 ≥ 0
or, equivalently, ,
H1Eξ +H1I β ≥ 0.
13
That is, the expected profit of investing with these probabilities in p1 is
positive (if not, the separating solution would be better). This condition is
precisely the contrary to the one we have obtained in the separating solution
(7). In this case, it must be convenient to invest in p1 with debt, despite
having to invest also with internal resources to compensate the manager.
For this condition be satisfied we need H1E > 0, which is possible only
when H2E > 0 and k is not too high. The other condition for this equilibrium
to be optimal is:
ΩExt > ΩInt
that is, the pooling equilibrium with external financing must be preferable
to the one with internal financing. Such pooling solution is not possible, be-
cause it wouldn’t satisfy the participation constraints. But, if this condition
is satisfied, the pooling equilibrium using a positive probability of external
financing will be better than the pooling equilibrium with internal financing.
As we have seen in the last part, this condition cannot be fulfilled if the
value of rD is endogenous.
4 Monetary Incentives
If there is no restriction on the compensation schemes that can be used,
and in particular if it is possible to pay a negative salary to the subsidiary’s
manager in some contingencies, then it is always possible to reach the first
best, given that both the principal and the agent are risk neutral. This
first best, as we have discussed before, consists of financing with internal
resources whenever the NPV of the project is positive. Then, in the first
best α2I = 1 and α2E = α1E = α1I = 0. Let W IV be the salary paid when the
project has obtained as result V in the case p2 and financing is internal. If
we take this values of α as given and put:
W IV (p2) = −bV
and the rest of variables of wage equal to zero, then all the incentive com-
patibility and participation constraints are satisfied.
The only difference with the complete information solution is the neces-
sity of paying a negative wage to give incentives to the managers to tell the
truth. If this is not allowed, then in general obtaining the first best won’t
be possible, and it will be necessary to find a second best policy.
Consider now the case of ‘limited liability’, that is, wages must always
be non-negative. This implies that the cost of bankruptcy for the manager
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cannot be imitated internally. In this case there is no reason to pay a pos-
itive wage when the manager announces p2. The main incentive problem
is precisely to avoid that a manager who observes p1 announces p2; pay-
ing a positive expected salary when the manager announces p2 can only
worsen the problem. Then, the only salary which will be positive, will be
w(p1) > 0, and, moreover, it will only be paid in the case in which the
manager announces p1 and the project is not enacted. Therefore, we can
limit the analysis to salary schemes that only pay a quantity w in case of
announcement p1. Observe that w (p2, p1) = w (p1) (the salary paid to the
manager when he says that the project has a probability of positive profit
p1 and in fact is p2).
Furthermore, we can concentrate our analysis on the cases in which mon-
etary incentives are used in order to achieve a separating solution. When a
pooling solution is selected, then there is no need to pay any positive wage,
since we do not need to provide incentives to differentiate the behavior of
high and low types.
We can show that the ‘never invest’ solution is optimal under exactly the
same circumstances than in the case of the absence of monetary incentives.
The comments made before also apply. Then, we will limit ourselves to
study the situations where there is investment.
The cases in which a separating solution with monetary incentives is
optimal are discussed in the next two propositions. We first consider the
case of low cost of bankruptcy.
Proposition 3 If p1bV − (1− p1) c > 0 the possible solutions are:
1. α1I = α1E = 0, α2I = 1, α2E = 0, w1 = p1bV is optimal if H1I < −p1bV ,
H1E < −(p1bV − (1− p1)c), H2I θ2 − θ1p1bV > 0 and
¡
H2I −H2E
¢
θ2 −
θ1(1− p1)c > 0
2. α1I = α1E = 0, α2I = 0, α2E = 1, w1 = p1bV −(1−p1)c is optimal if H1I <
−p1bV , H1E < −(p1bV − (1− p1)c), H2Eθ2 − θ1 (p1bV − (1− p1)c) > 0
and
¡
H2E −H2I
¢
θ2 + θ1(1− p1)c > 0
The two possibilities consist of only investing in the case p2. Taking into
account that we are going to pay the manager a wage in the case p1, there
is no point in investing in this case, since H1I < 0. That is, if we choose
to pay a salary in p1 it is not necessary to provide further incentives to the
manager by investing in this case.
Suppose first H1E > 0. When is it optimal to set α1E > 0? The only
possibilities for that are a pooling equilibrium, that doesn’t need monetary
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incentives (analyzed in the previous section) or a separating equilibrium
where the investment is financed with internal resources in the case p2 and
with external resources in the case p1. To satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint for p1 we need w
1 ≥ (1− p1)c.
If we set w1 to the lowest possible level (that is, (1− p1) c) then the
incentive compatibility constraint for p2 is
p2bV ≥ p2bV + (p2 − p1)c.
Since p2 > p1 this expression cannot satisfied. Therefore, this separating
equilibrium is not possible.
Moreover, if we consider the possibility of paying also a monetary incen-
tive in p2 we obtain the inequality
(1− p1)c ≤ w1 − w2 ≤ (1− p2)c.
Since (1−p1) > (1−p2) there is no value of w1−w2 for which the inequalities
are satisfied. As we have pointed out before, paying a monetary incentive
when the type of project is p2 would give more incentives to the subsidiary’s
manager for not telling the truth when the project is p1. Therefore, when
monetary incentives can be used and the cost of them are cheaper, the
subsidiary will never invest in the case in which the probability of success is
p1.
In the case of choosing α2I = 1, observe the conditions simply result from
a comparison with the cost of using other alternatives to provide incentives.
For instance, H1I < −p1bV means that the cost of using a salary w1 = p1bV
is smaller than the loss if we invested in p1 with internal financing; the
cheaper way to provide incentives is then the wage. Similarly, the condition
H1E < − (p1bV − (1− p1)c) compares the loss of investing in p1 with external
resources with the salary that would have to be paid in this case (this is
smaller than p1bV , since the manager is deterred from falsely announcing
p2 by the disutility suffered under debt financing). The condition H2I θ2 −
θ1p1bV > 0 says that the expected profit has to be positive, and the last
condition is simply the comparison between the profit obtained with this
option (H2I θ2 − θ1p1bV ) and the one that would be obtained with external
financing in p2 (H
2
Eθ2 − θ1(p1bV − (1 − p1)c). This last condition can be
written also as:
H2I θ2 ≥ H2Eθ2 + θ1(1− p1)c
That is, the profit of investing with internal financing in p2 must be
greater than the profit of investing with external financing in p2 plus the
saving on monetary incentive costs.
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In the case of α2E = 1 the comments are the same, but with the indexes
changed.
When is a separating solution better than a pooling solution? The pool-
ing equilibrium with internal financing is preferred to the separating equi-
librium with monetary incentives when
H1I > −p1bV
Similarly, the pooling solution with external financing is preferred to the
separating solution if
H1E > −(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
We have already seen that the condition¡
H2E −H2I
¢
θ2 + θ1(1− p1)c > 0
(for α2E = 1 to be optimal) is just the comparison between the profit in
this situation and the profit if we opted for α2I = 1. The term θ1(1 − p1)c
shows the savings that external financing allows in the incentive costs; these
savings are realized when the project is of type p1, this is the reason why the
term is multiplied by its respective probability θ1. When we endogenize rD
(as we have seen before, p2(1 + rD) = 1 + r) the inequality simply becomes
(1− p1) cθ1 > (1− p2) kθ2,
namely, the external financing will be preferred to the internal one when the
saving in the incentive cost is higher than the expected cost of bankruptcy
for CS.
The next proposition deals with the case of high c.
Proposition 4 If p1bV −(1−p1)c < 0 the possible solution using monetary
incentives are: α1I = α1E = 0, α2I = 1, α2E = 0, w1 = p1bV will be optimal
when: H1I < −p1bV, H1E < (1− p1)c− p1bV
The conditions for the optimality of the trivial solution are the same as
before, and we have also already discussed the conditions for the optimality
of the case α2I = 1. In this case we never have α2E > 0 since monetary
incentives are less expensive than using debt (this differs from the case in
which c is low).
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5 Conclusions
As we have seen, there are cases in which a firm may look for external
financing, despite the fact that internal funds are available and external
funds are more costly than the internal ones. This occurs when external
debt is used to provide incentives to subsidiary’s managers.
We have analyzed the different cases which may arise. When the cost
of bankruptcy for the subsidiary’s manager is small and monetary incen-
tives are not allowed, then a separating solution is not possible. Therefore,
the firm would invest in all projects (or none) depending on what is more
profitable in expected terms. We find two cases where external financing
is used: In the first case, financing always comes from debt. This case will
be preferable when the interest on debt is low or when the fraction of the
investment lost in case of bankruptcy
¡
k
I
¢
is low. However, if we take an
endogenous value of rD, the pooling equilibrium with internal financing will
be always preferable, so we conclude that a pooling equilibrium with exter-
nal financing is possible only with an exogenous value of rD. The second
case consists on using external financing only when p = p2, and investing
in p1 with a probability smaller than 1 using internal financing. This case
will be chosen for small values of p1, because the probability of inefficient
investment will be very close to zero. When rD is determined endogenously,
this solution turns out to be possible only for a sufficiently high value of k.
When the cost of bankruptcy for the subsidiary’s manager is high enough,
we can reach an equilibrium where only good projects are enacted, without
using monetary incentives. The way to provide incentives to the manager
will be precisely the existence of a positive probability of being financed with
debt. If rD is calculated endogenously and the bankruptcy cost for CS is
zero, then the first best is reached because in this case the cost of debt will
be equal to the cost of internal resources for the CS. Therefore monetary
incentives are needed only when capital markets are imperfect or bankruptcy
costs for CS are high. However, this is only true if we can assume that CS
can commit not to deviate from their decision once the information about
the project is obtained. The reason of this is that if bankruptcy costs for CS
are zero, they have incentives to deviate from the equilibrium and to finance
with debt the project of probability of success p1. When CS can’t commit,
it will only be able to assure that they are not going to invest with debt in
the bad project if bankruptcy cost for them is high enough. If bankruptcy
cost for CS is not zero, the obtained profit with this equilibrium won’t still
be equal to the first best and it will be higher the lower is the value of p1 (if
p1 is high, perhaps a pooling equilibrium will be preferable), and the higher
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is the value of p2 and c.
When monetary incentives are available the first best can be reached
simply making the manager pay the equivalent of its personal benefit when
he announces a good project. This however requires a negative salary. If
limited liability is assumed, then we can obtain a separating equilibrium
where the low profitability projects will never be enacted and the manager
receives a wage in this case. Depending on the cost of this incentive, it
will be preferable to use it or simply apply the results obtained previously
(using a pooling solution and invest also in the case p1). In the case of low
bankruptcy cost for the subsidiary’s manager, this separating equilibrium
can be realized with internal or external financing. If the value of rD is
determined endogenously, external financing will be preferred to internal
financing when the saving in the cost of the monetary incentive is higher than
the expected bankruptcy cost of CS. However, if the bankruptcy cost for the
subsidiary’s manager is high, external financing with monetary incentives
will never be selected, because in this case there is no saving of incentives
cost.
19
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. If p1bV − (1− p1) c > 0 then the individual ra-
tionality constraint of type p1 is always satisfied and can be ignored. We
are going to solve the problem under the hypothesis that incentive compat-
ibility constraint for p2 is satisfied with a strict inequality, so the associated
Lagrange multiplier is zero. Defining the Lagrangian as:
L = α1IH1I θ1 + α1EH1Eθ1 + α2IH2I θ2 + α2EH2Eθ2 +
+λ
£
p1bV (α1I + α1E − α2I − α2E)− (α1E − α2E) (1− p1) c
¤
+
+µ1Iα1I + µ1Eα1E + γ1(1− α1I − α1E) +
+µ2Iα2I + µ2Eα2E + γ2(1− α2I − α2E)
The first order conditions are:
α1I : H1I θ1 + λp1bV + µ1I − γ1 = 0
α1E : H1Eθ1 + λ(p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ1E − γ1 = 0
α2I : H2I θ2 − λp1bV + µ2I − γ2 = 0
α2E : H2Eθ2 − λ(p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ2E − γ2 = 0
These equations and the complementary slackness conditions have to be
satisfied at an optimal point.
Claim 5 There is no solution with λ = 0.
Proof. If λ = 0 then
γ1 = θ1H1I + µ1I
As H1I < 0, this implies µ
1
I > 0 and α1I = 0. Moreover:
γ2 = θ2H2I + µ2I > 0
so α2I + α2E = 1. Subtracting the condition relative to α2E to the condition
of α2I , we obtain:
µ2E = µ
2
I + θ2
¡
H2I −H2E
¢
> 0.
Since θ2
¡
H2I −H2E
¢
> 0, we have α2E = 0. Now observe that if α2I +α2E = 1,
α2E = 0 and α1I = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint cannot be
satisfied.
20
The claim implies that at an optimal point the incentive compatibility
constraint for p = p1 will be always satisfied as equality. Define now
σ = p1bV − (1− p1) c
p1bV
.
Then Claim 5 implies that at any solution point
α1I − α2I = σ
¡
α2E − α1E
¢
(8)
We will say that a solution is pooling if α1I = α2I and α1E = α2E. The next
result shows that if any of the two equalities is true then the other also has
to be true.
Claim 6 α1E = α2E ⇐⇒ α1I = α2I .
Proof. Follows immediately from (8).
When we restrict attention to pooling solutions, the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint is automatically satisfied. The assumption p1bV −(1− p1) c >
0 implies that individual rationality is also always satisfied. Therefore the
problem is simply
max αI
¡
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2
¢
+ αE
¡
H1Eθ1 +H2Eθ2
¢
subject to feasibility constraints, where αI and αE are the common proba-
bilities for the two types. If we call ΩInt = H1I θ1+H2I θ2 and ΩExt = H1Eθ1+
H2Eθ2 then obviously the optimal pooling solution will be αI = αE = 0 if
max {ΩInt,ΩExt} ≤ 0, it will be αI = 1 and αE = 0 if ΩInt ≥ max {0,ΩExt}
and αI = 0 and αE = 1 if ΩExt ≥ max {0,ΩInt}.
The problem is therefore whether the solution is pooling or separat-
ing. Define Ω = max {0,ΩInt,ΩExt} the maximum value attainable under
a pooling solution. The next claim establishes the structure of a separating
solution. Claim 6 implies that at a separating solution we must have both
α1E 6= α2E and α1I 6= α2I .
Claim 7 The solution α1I = σ,α1E = 0, α2E = 1 and α2I = 0 is optimal when
σH1I θ1 +H2Eθ2 > Ω.
Proof. Substituting α1I from (8) in the incentive compatibility constraint
we can rewrite the objective function as
α2I
¡
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2
¢
+ α2E
¡
σH1I θ1 +H2Eθ2
¢
+ α1E
¡
H1E − σH1I
¢
θ1
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Since σH1I θ1+H2Eθ2 > Ω, at any solution we must have α2I = 0 and α2E = 1.
From 8 this in turn implies
α1I = σ
¡
1− α1E
¢
.
Now notice that σH1I θ1+H2Eθ2 > Ω implies σH1I θ1+H2Eθ2 > H1Eθ1+H2Eθ2,
which in turn implies
¡
H1E − σH1I
¢
< 0. Thus, at any optimal point α1E = 0
and α1I = σ.
Proof of proposition 2. The Lagrangian is:
L = α1IH1I θ1 + α1EH1Eθ1 + α2IH2I θ2 + α2EH2Eθ2 +
+λ1
£
p1bV
¡
α1I + α1E
¢
− α1E (1− p1) c
¤
+λ2
£
p1bV (α1I + α1E − α2I − α2E)− (α1E − α2E) (1− p1) c
¤
+
+µ1Iα1I + µ1Eα1E + γ1(1− α1I − α1E) +
+µ2Iα2I + µ2Eα2E + γ2(1− α2I − α2E)
The first order conditions are:
α1I : H1I θ1 + (λ1 + λ2) p1bV + µ1I − γ1 = 0
α1E : H1Eθ1 + (λ1 + λ2) (p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ1E − γ1 = 0
α2I : H2I θ2 − λ2p1bV + µ2I − γ2 = 0
α2E : H2Eθ2 − λ2(p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ2E − γ2 = 0
We first observe that there can be no solution with α1E = 1, since in that
case the participation constraint for p1 wouldn’t be satisfied. Furthermore,
this participation constraint gives an upper limit for α1E , given by α1E ≤
p1bV
(1−p1)c−p1bV α
2
I .
Let us denote as β = (1−p1)c−p1bV(1−p1)c and ξ =
p1bV
(1−p1)c , and Φ
2 and Φ1 as in
4 and 5. We have the following result.
Claim 8 The solution α1I = α1E = 0,α2I = β and α2E = ξ is optimal only if
Φ1 ≤ 0, and Φ2 ≥ max {ΩInt, 0}.
Proof. Under the proposed solution the first order conditions yield
µ1I
p1bV
=
−H1I θ1
p1bV
− (λ1 + λ2)
µ1E
(1− p1)c− p1bV
=
−H1Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
+ (λ1 + λ2)
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The positivity conditions will be satisfied if and only if
H1E
(1− p1)c− p1bV
≤ λ1 + λ2 ≤
−H1I
p1bV
which is possible only if
βH1I θ1 + ξH1Eθ1 ≤ 0.
The conditions γ2 ≥ 0, µ2I = µ2E = 0 yield
−H2Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
≤ λ2 =
(H2I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
≤ H
2
I θ2
p1bV
.
Therefore we need
max
½
−H2Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
, 0
¾
≤ (H
2
I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
≤ H
2
I θ2
p1bV
.
Operating, we obtain:
−H2Ep1bV ≤ H2I ((1− p1)c− p1bV ) . (9)
This condition is equivalent to
βH2I θ2 + ξH2Eθ2 ≥ 0.
(Notice that if H2E > 0 this condition is always satisfied.)
With this value of λ2, the value of λ1 must satisfy:
H1Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
− (H
2
I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
≤ λ1 ≤
−H1I θ1
p1bV
− (H
2
I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
And the following condition must be satisfied:
−H1I θ1
p1bV
− (H
2
I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
≥ 0
which can be expressed as:
ξH2Eθ2 + βH2I θ2 ≥ H1I θ1 +H2I θ2
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Claim 9 The pooling solution with internal financing: α1E = 0,α2E = 0,
α1I = 1 and α2I = 1 is optimal when ΩInt ≥ max
©
0,ΩExt ,Φ2,Φ1
ª
.
Proof. µiI = 0, µ
i
E ≥ 0, γi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
As the first IR constraint is positive, λ1 = 0. So, we obtain:
µ1E
(1− p1)c
=
(H1I −H1E)θ1
(1− p1)c
+ λ2
γ1
p1bV
=
H1I θ1
p1bV
+ λ2
µ2E
(1− p1)c
=
(H2I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
− λ2
γ2
p1bV
=
H2I θ2
p1bV
− λ2
Therefore, to be the parameters positive:
max
(
−
¡
H1I −H1E
¢
θ1
(1− p1)c
,
−H1I θ1
p1bV
)
≤ λ2 ≤ min
½
(H2I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
,
H2I θ2
p1bV
¾
,
which can be written as:
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2 ≥ 0
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2 ≥ βH2I θ2 + ξH2Eθ2
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2 ≥ βH1I θ1 + ξH1Eθ1
This condition is included in the first one when H2E < 0.
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2 ≥ H1Eθ1 +H2Eθ2
Claim 10 The solution α1I = α2I = β, α1E = α2E = ξ will be optimal in the
case: Φ1 ≥ 0, Φ2 ≥ 0 and ΩExt ≥ ΩInt. This will be only optimal if H2E > 0.
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Proof. The optimality of this solution requires: µiE = 0, µ
i
I = 0,
γi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2.
The resulting conditions are:
−H1I θ1
p1bV
≤ λ1 + λ2 =
¡
H1E −H1I
¢
θ1
(1− p1)c
≤ H
1
Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
−H2Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
≤ λ2 =
(H2I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
≤ H
2
I θ2
p1bV
As λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 (the IR and IC constraints are satisfied with
equality) we obtain the following conditions:
max
½
−H1I θ1
p1bV
, 0
¾
≤
¡
H1E −H1I
¢
θ1
(1− p1)c
≤ H
1
Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
max
½
−H2Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
, 0
¾
≤ (H
2
I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
≤ H
2
I θ2
p1bV
Observe that, as H1I < 0, it won’t be necessary to compare it with zero.
In this way, this condition can be written as:
−H1I
p1bV
≤
¡
H1E −H1I
¢
(1− p1)c
≤ H
1
E
(1− p1)c− p1bV
Or, what it is the same:


βH1I θ1 + ξH1Eθ1 ≥ 0
H1E −H1I > 0
H1E > 0
As we have assumed that H1I < 0, H
1
E must be positive for the first
condition be satisfied. Then, the last condition is not necessary. In the
same way, if H1E > 0, and H
1
I < 0, then necessarily, H
1
E −H1I > 0.
We can summarize the conditions in:
βH1I θ1 + ξH1Eθ1 ≥ 0
H1E can not be positive if H
2
E < 0. Then, for this solution be optimal,
H2E > 0.
The second condition can be written as:
βH2I θ2 + ξH2Eθ2 ≥ 0
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If we assume H2E > 0 this condition is not needed, because this will be
always positive.
Moreover, as λ2 = (H
2
I−H2E)θ2
(1−p1)c
λ1 =
¡
H1E −H1I
¢
θ1
(1− p1)c
− (H
2
I −H2E)θ2
(1− p1)c
=
H1Eθ1 +H2Eθ2 − (H1I θ1 +H2I θ2)
(1− p1)c
≥ 0
or, what is the same:
H1Eθ1 +H2Eθ2 ≥ H1I θ1 +H2I θ2
Claim 11 The trivial solution α1E = α1I = α2E = α2I = 0 can only be optimal
if H2E < 0. In this case, the optimality conditions are: Φ
2 ≤ 0, ΩInt ≤ 0
Proof. The conditions having into account that γ1 = γ2 = 0 will be:
µ1I
p1bV
=
−H1I θ1
p1bV
− (λ1 + λ2)
µ1E
(1− p1)c− p1bV
=
−H1Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
+ (λ1 + λ2)
µ2I
p1bV
=
−H2I θ2
p1bV
+ λ2
µ2E
(1− p1)c− p1bV
=
−H2Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
− λ2
Therefore, the positivity conditions will be satisfied if:
H2I θ2
p1bV
≤ λ2 ≤
−H2Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
max
½
H1Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
, 0
¾
≤ λ1 + λ2 ≤
−H1I θ1
p1bV
We observe in the first condition that if H2E > 0, the trivial solution is
impossible.
If H2E < 0, then the conditions will be the following:
H2I θ2
p1bV
≤ −H
2
Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
max
½
H1Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
, 0
¾
≤ −H
1
I θ1
p1bV
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This conditions can be written as:
ξH2Eθ2 + βH2I θ2 ≤ 0
ξH1Eθ1 + βH1I θ1 ≤ 0
The first condition reminds us that H2E must be negative. The last
condition is not necessary because we have assumed that H1I < 0 and H
1
E is
always smaller than H2E.
Moreover, as we know the values between λ2 is, we obtain that:
λ1 ≤
−H1I θ1
p1bV
− λ2 <
−H1I θ1
p1bV
− H
2
I θ2
p1bV
=
1
p1bV
(−H1I θ1 −H2I θ2)
So, other condition for λ1 ≥ 0 will be −H1I θ1−H2I θ2 ≥ 0 or, what is the
same:
H1I θ1 +H2I θ2 ≤ 0
In the same way:
λ1 ≥
H1Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
− λ2 >
H1Eθ1
(1− p1)c− p1bV
− −H
2
Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
=
H1Eθ1 +H2Eθ2
(1− p1)c− p1bV
We can show that H1Eθ1 +H2Eθ2 < 0, because H2E < 0 and, therefore,
H1E < 0.So, this condition is not restrictive.
The conditions don’t overlap again.
Proof of proposition 3. The individual rationality constraint can be
ignored because it is always satisfied since p1bV − (1− p1)c > 0.
We can pose the Lagrangian:
L = α1IH1I θ1 + α1EH1Eθ1 − w1θ1 + α2IH2I θ2 + α2EH2Eθ2 +
+λ
£
p1bV (α1I + α1E − α2I − α2E)− (α1E − α2E) (1− p1) c+ w1
¤
+
+µ1Iα1I + µ1Eα1E + γ1(1− α1I − α1E) + δw1
+µ2Iα2I + µ2Eα2E + γ2(1− α2I − α2E)
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And the first order conditions:
α1I : H1I θ1 + λp1bV + µ1I − γ1 = 0
α1E : H1Eθ1 + λ(p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ1E − γ1 = 0
α2I : H2I θ2 − λp1bV + µ2I − γ2 = 0
α2E : H2Eθ2 − λ(p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ2E − γ2 = 0
w1 : −θ1 + λ+ δ = 0
The analysis of the first order conditions produce the following results:
Claim 12 There is no solution with λ = 0.
Proof. If λ = 0 then the condition of w1 implies δ = θ1 > 0, that is
w = 0. Then, the system is identical to the case where no salary is paid and
we can apply the result (5).
As the incentive compatibility constraint is always satisfied with equality,
the problem can be expressed as:
max
α1I ,α
1
E ,α
2
I ,α
2
E
¡
α1IH1I + α1EH1E −
¡¡¡
α2I + α2E
¢
−
¡
α1I + α1E
¢¢
p1bV −
¡
α2E − α1E
¢
(1− p1) c
¢¢
θ1
+
¡
α2IH2I + α2EH2E
¢
θ2
s.t. ¡¡
α2I + α2E
¢
−
¡
α1I + α1E
¢¢
p1bV −
¡
α2E − α1E
¢
(1− p1) c ≥ 0
αiI ≥ 0; αiE ≥ 0; αiI + αiE ≤ 1,
where the first inequality guarantee that salary will be positive. We write
the Lagrangian as:
L = α1IH1I θ1 + α1EH1Eθ1 + α2IH2I θ2 + α2EH2Eθ2 +
+(θ1 − δ)
£
p1bV (α1I + α1E − α2I − α2E)− (α1E − α2E) (1− p1) c
¤
+
+µ1Iα1I + µ1Eα1E + γ1(1− α1I − α1E)
+µ2Iα2I + µ2Eα2E + γ2(1− α2I − α2E)
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and the system of first order conditions result:
H1I θ1 + (θ1 − δ) p1bV + µ1I − γ1 = 0
H1Eθ1 + (θ1 − δ) (p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ1E − γ1 = 0
H2I θ2 − (θ1 − δ) p1bV + µ2I − γ2 = 0
H2Eθ2 − (θ1 − δ) (p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ2E − γ2 = 0
Claim 13 The solution is α1I = α2E = α2I = α2E = 0, w = 0 if ΩInt ≤ 0,Υ ≤
0 and ΩExt ≤ 0
Proof. The first order conditions generate the following system:
µ1I
p1bV
= −H
1
I θ1
p1bV
− θ1 + δ
µ1E
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
= − H
1
Eθ1
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
+ δ − θ1
µ2I
p1bV
= −H
2
I θ2
p1bV
− δ + θ1
µ2E
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
= − H
2
Eθ2
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
− δ + θ1
δ ≥ H
1
I θ1
p1bV
+ θ1
δ ≥ H
1
Eθ1
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
+ θ1
δ ≤ −H
2
I θ2
p1bV
+ θ1
δ ≤ − H
2
Eθ2
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
+ θ1
Therefore,
max
½
H1I θ1
p1bV
,
H1Eθ1
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
¾
≤ δ − θ1 ≤ min
½
−H
2
I θ2
p1bV
,− H
2
Eθ2
(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
¾
.
As δ− θ1 ≤ 0 (if not, µ1I and µ2I couldn’t be positive), we obtain exactly
the same conditions as in the case without monetary incentives (??) and we
obtain the conclusion.
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Claim 14 The solution is α1I = α1E = 0, α2I = 1, α2E = 0, w1 = p1bV
if H1I ≤ −p1bV , H1E ≤ −(p1bV − (1 − p1)c), H2I θ2 − θ1p1bV ≥ 0 and¡
H2I −H2E
¢
θ2 − θ1(1− p1)c ≥ 0
Proof. The first order conditions knowing that µ1I ≥ 0, µ2I = 0, µiE ≥
0, δ = 0, γ1 = 0, γ2 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, are:
µ1I = −H1I θ1 − θ1p1bV
µ1E = −H1Eθ1 − θ1(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
γ2 = H2I θ2 − θ1p1bV
µ2E =
¡
H2I −H2E
¢
θ2 − θ1(1− p1)c
The sign of the parameters will be satisfied if the proposed conditions are
fulfilled.
Claim 15 The solution is α1I = α1E = 0, α2I = 0, α2E = 1, w1 = p1bV − (1−
p1)c if H
1
I ≤ −p1bV , H1E ≤ −(p1bV−(1−p1)c), H2Eθ2−θ1 (p1bV − (1− p1)c) ≥
0 and
¡
H2E −H2I
¢
θ2 + θ1(1− p1)c ≥ 0
Proof. The parameters must have the following values: µiI ≥ 0, µ1E ≥ 0,
µ2E = 0, δ = 0, γ1 = 0, γ2 ≥ 0 i = 1, 2.
µ1I = −H1I θ1 − θ1p1bV
µ1E = −H1Eθ1 − θ1(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
γ2 = H2Eθ2 − θ1(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
µ2I =
¡
H2E −H2I
¢
θ2 + θ1(1− p1)c
We obtain the conditions from this system.
Proof of proposition 4. We have to add to the previous Lagrangian the
incentive rationality constraint for p1:
L =
¡
α1IH1I + α1EH1E − w
¢
θ1 +
¡
α2IH2I + α2EH2E
¢
θ2 +
+λ1
£
p1bV (α1I + α1E)− α1E (1− p1) c+ w1
¤
+λ2
£
p1bV (α1I + α1E − α2I − α2E)− (α1E − α2E) (1− p1) c+ w1
¤
+
+µ1Iα1I + µ1Eα1E + γ1(1− α1I − α1E) + δw1
+µ2Iα2I + µ2Eα2E + γ2(1− α2I − α2E)
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The first order conditions are:
α1I : H1I θ1 + (λ1 + λ2)p1bV + µ1I − γ1 = 0
α1E : H1Eθ1 + (λ1 + λ2)(p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ1E − γ1 = 0
α2I : H2I θ2 − λ2p1bV + µ2I − γ2 = 0
α2E : H2Eθ2 − λ2(p1bV − (1− p1)c) + µ2E − γ2 = 0
w1 : (λ1 + λ2 − θ1) + δ = 0
Claim 16 The trivial solution α1E = α1I = α2E = α2I = 0 is optimal only if:
βH2I θ2 + ξH2Eθ2 ≤ 0, βH1I θ1 + ξH1Eθ1 ≤ 0, H1I θ1 +H2I θ2 ≤ 0
Proof. It is the same solution as the obtained before without using
monetary incentives(11). It is proved in the same way.
Claim 17 The solution α1I = α1E = 0, α2I = 1, α2E = 0, w1 = p1bV will be
optimal when: H1I ≤ −p1bV, H1E ≤ (1−p1)c−p1bV,H2I θ2− θ1p1bV ≥ 0 and
H2I θ2 ≥ H2Eθ2 + θ1(1− p1)c
Proof. The parameters must take the following values: µ1I ≥ 0, µ2I = 0,
µiE ≥ 0,λ2 ≥ 0,λ1 = 0, δ = 0, γ1 = 0, γ2 ≥ 0 , i = 1, 2.
λ2 = θ1
µ1I = −H1I θ1 − θ1p1bV
µ1E = −H1Eθ1 − θ1(p1bV − (1− p1)c)
γ2 = H2I θ2 − θ1p1bV
µ2E =
¡
H2I −H2E
¢
θ2 − λ2(1− p1)c =
¡
H2I −H2E
¢
θ2 − θ1(1− p1)c
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